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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLAYTON E. BUTT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARCELL GRAHAM, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8592 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Clayton E. Butt, was charged with and 
[after trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County] convicted of, the crime of 
carnal knowledge. Appeal from said conviction was per-
fected to this Court. 
Appellant comes now before this Court appealing from 
a decision adverse to him in a habeas corpus proceeding 
in the Court below. 
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It is your appellant's contention that the prosecution 
suppressed evidence known to the prosecution to exist such 
as would amount to a denial of due process of law; appel-
lant further contends in this cause that the Court below 
also erred in denying an oral motion for a writ of coram 
nobis based upon alleged newly discovered evidence, i. e., 
the same evidence alleged to have been suppressed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Statment of Facts" set forth in appellant's brief 
strays far from the record made in this cause in the Court 
below. Since .no appeal was taken from the original con-
viction of your appellant and since there was no record 
made in this cause of the proceedings before the "Board of 
Pardons" we would contend that references made to the 
trial of the cause and/ or to the proceedings had before the 
"Board of Pardons" have no proper place in appellant's 
brief. The writ of habeas corpus is not to be substituted for 
an appeal ; the proceedings had before the "Board of Par-
dons" are not properly before this Court for review. We 
shall not here concern ourselves with those matters. 
It is your appellant's primary contention that there 
was a suppression of evidence by the prosecution such as 
would deny him due process of law; the evidence alleged 
to have been suppressed by the prosecution was that of a 
physical examination performed by an Ogden, Utah physi-
cian upon the prosecutrix in the trial of your appellant 
upon a charge of carnal knowledge. We admit such exam-
ination was made and, that the prosecution was aware of 
the examination and the results thereof. It is apparent 
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from the record that the accused, appellant here, and his 
counsel at time of trial were equally aware of said exam-
ination having been made and the results thereof were 
available to the defense before and at the time of trial. 
The record in this cause completely sustains the con-
tentions of respondent. First witness in the proceedings 
below was your appellant, Clayton E. Butt; his testimony 
was, in part, as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Woolley) What was the name of 
the girl with whom you had sexual relations at the 
time of that trial? 
"A. June Durrant. 
"Q. Where did she live? 
"A. In Ogden, Utah. 
"Q. Where were you arrested? 
"A. In Ogden, in her home. 
"Q. Shortly after your arrest did you have a 
conversation with the father of this girl concerning 
having the girl examined by a doctor? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. And will you tell us about what the sub-
stance of that conversation was? 
"A. Mr. Durrant accused me of having had 
sexual relationship with June and I told him I had 
not, if he would take the girl and have her examined 
it would prove it, and I told him I was even willing 
to pay the doctor's fee if he would have her ex-
amined. 
"Q. After that time did you learn anything 
concerning this examination ? 
"A. No, I did not" (R. 15-16). 
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If your appellant failed to learn anything more concerning 
the examination of the prosecutrix by the physician such 
was the result of his own neglect and not because of any sup-
pression on the part of the state. 
Called to the witness stand next for appellant was Tel 
Charlier, Esq., attorney at law, and your appellant's counsel 
at time of trial ; he testified : 
"Q. Do you know the plaintiff in this action, 
Mr. Butt? 
"A. I do. 
"Q. Did you represent him on a charge of car-
nal knowledge last year ? 
''A. I did. 
"Q. Now did you prior to the trial on that case 
and during the trial and prior to preliminary hear .. 
ing, did you know that the complaining witness in 
that trial had a physical examination? 
"A. I had been told that by Mr. Butt prior to 
the trial. I don't know whether it was prior to the 
preliminary hearing or not. 
"Q. What did he say? 
"A. He said he understood that she had been 
given a physical examination the night he was ar-
rested in Ogden. 
"Q. Did he say that he understood that she did, 
or she should have? 
"A. He told me, as I recall, that he understood 
that she had done or that he had requested it, and 
I believe he told me that the officers had told him 
that she had been given an examination. 
"Q. Do you re111ember where that conversation 
took place? 
"A. It took place in my office, and at that time 
I told him that I did not have time to go to Ogden 
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and I suggested he go to Ogden and check with the 
officers and see what he could find out, if anything, 
about this examination and if there was anything 
that might be favorable to use in his defense we 
would see if we could get enough money together 
to get the doctors down to testify. 
"Q. Did you have a conversation with Jay 
Banks concerning a physical examination given to 
the girl? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. When and where was that? 
"A. It was here in the County Building in Mr. 
Bank's office in the County Attorney's office just 
before the preliminary hearing. 
"Q. And what did Mr. Banks tell you about 
that physical examination? 
"A. He told me that he understood that there 
had been a physical examination made on her, as I 
recall. Said it was inconclusive as far as they were 
concerned" (R. 20-21). 
As for what the prosecution told him, Mr. Charlier had this 
to say, finally: 
''A. As I recall that is all that he did tell me, 
that there was this physical examination, that was 
inconclusive, and that some slides or some tests had 
been destroyed or ruined or something of that na-
ture. 
"Q. And that is about the extent of the conver-
sation about what the physical examination showed, 
is that right? 
"A. That is as much as I can recall about it" 
(R. 22). 
Had your appellant's trial counsel considered this evidence 
essential to the defense it is at least crystal clear that the 
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prosecution did not deny to him its existence or attempt to 
suppress it. 
Ivan Taylor, M. D., was the next witness for your ap-
pellant. The doctor had examined the prosecutrix, and her 
sister; (R. 26) the result of the examinations were negative, 
i. e., they disclosed no spermatoza (R. 29). However, the 
doctor had no knowledge of the elapsed time between the 
sexual act [or whether or not there was one] and the time 
of the examination (R. 30-31). Nor did the doctor know 
where the girls might have gone or might have done be-
tween the time of the act and the time of the examination 
( R. 30-33) . The doctor did not disclose to the prosecution 
prior to the preliminary hearing what the slides disclosed: 
"Q. Were you subpoenaed down here for pre-
liminary hearing on Mr. Butt's trial, Dr. Taylor? 
"A. I was subpoenaed once. I don't know what 
that was for. I was subpoenaed. 
"Q. Where did you have to come to? 
"A. I was to report here to the District At-
torney's office for Mr. Banks. 
"Q. Did you discuss the matter of these slides 
with Mr. Banks at this time? 
''A. No, sir. I was asked regarding them. I 
said this was privileged information, that any in-
formation I gave would of necessity be ordered by 
the court. 
"THE COURT: Is that what you told Mr. 
Banks? 
"THE WITNESS : As near as I can tell. Any 
information a doctor has regarding a patient is priv-
ileged information" (R. 28). 
* * * * * 
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"Q. (By Mr. Woolley) Did you have occasion 
to talk to Mr. Aldon Anderson about the slides, the 
District Attorney here? 
"A. I don't recall talking to Mr. Anderson 
about the slides" ( R. 28) . 
Jay E. Banks, Esq., of the prosecution was called by 
the appellant. Mr. Banks withheld nothing from your ap-
pellant's trial counsel, in fact he "* * * offered Mr. 
Charlier to come up and I would show him what we had 
in the State's case, * * *" (R. 36). 
Aldon Anderson, Esq., also of the prosecution, was 
called for appellant. Mr. Anderson withheld no informa-
tion nor evidence from the defense and he presented the 
State's case on information available to him which proved 
sufficient to obtain a conviction [without the use of the 
results of the medical examination which he knew to be 
negative] and he suppressed no evidence (R. 38-40). 
The evidence adduced in the Court below fails. com-
pletely to reveal a suppression of any evidence whatsoever 
and certainly discloses nothing that could be labeled "newly 
discovered evidence." 
STATE:ThtlENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR; THERE 
WAS }TO SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE AND 
NO SHOWING MADE OF ANY NEWLY DIS-
COVERED EVIDENCE SUCH AS WOULD JUS-
TIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CORAM 
NOBIS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW DID NO'T ERR; THERE 
WAS NO SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE AND 
NO SHOWING MADE OF ANY NEWLY DIS-
COVERED EVIDENCE SUCH AS WOULD JUS~ 
TIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CORAM .. 
NOBIS. 
Respondent would concur with appellant in that prose-
cuting attorneys have an obligation to protect the innocent 
equal to their obligation to convict the guilty; that know-
ingly suppressing evidence material to the defendant's cause 
could amount to a denial of due process; and, that, in a 
proper case the writ of coram nobis may issue in this juris-
diction upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. Neal 
v. Beckstead, 285, P. 2d 129, 3 Utah 2d 403. 
But, in the absence of any suppression of material evi-
dence and for the lack of any newly discovered evidence 
neither of the great writs should be imposed upon for the 
purposes of an appeal nor the granting of a new trial. 
The issues raised in this appeal are issues of fact only; 
appellant's cause falls for want of proof, not from lack of 
support of la,v. Appellant might have prevailed in the 
Court below had his contentions been well founded within 
the s'Oul of the law-reason, and proof thereof adduced. 
Respondent readily concedes that: 
"The deliberate suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to a defendant may constitute 
a denial of due process." Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 
213. 
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But, we do not concede that that for what petitioner con-
tends here rises to the tests promulgated by the authorities 
cited in his brief such as United States v. Baldi, 195 Fed. 
2d 815, wherein it was shown that the prosecution delib-
erately suppressed the fact that the bullet which killed the 
officer was not of a caliber which could have been fired 
from the petitioner's weapon, and that the prosecutor had 
in his- constructive possession the death bullet, and that 
even though asked if there were other bullets than those 
in evidence, did not inform defense counsel of the existence 
of this bullet. In that case, apparently the bullet which 
killed the officer was actually fired from the gun of a fel-
low-officer. Nor, is there here a factual situation, as in 
United States v. Ragen, 86 Fed. Supp. 382, wherein it was 
c'Onclusively shown in the habeas corpus proceedings that 
the victim of the alleged rapist had not been raped, but 
was in fact a virgin within the knowledge of the prosecu-
tion. Those are cases in which there is proof of the delib-
erate suppression of evidence which was vital to the de-
fense; a failure on the part of the prosecution to observe 
that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 
justic~truly a denial of due process. The suppression of 
evidence herein contended for seems a far cry from the 
factual situations presented to the courts in the above cases. 
In fact there was none. 
We think the United States District Court, W. D. Penn., 
in May of 1954, correctly stated the rule, saying: 
"Evidence is not suppressed or withheld if the 
accused has knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances, or if they otherwise become available to him 
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during the trial." United States v. Dye, 123 Fed. 
Supp. 762. 
The record in this case conclusively shows that the appel-
lant' Butt had requested that the examination be made by 
the physician, and that he knew, as his counsel testified, 
that the examination had been made because the police offi-
cers told him so; further, there is absolutely no question 
but what counsel representing the appellant at the original 
trial, by his own admission, knew of the existence of the 
allegedly suppressed evidence. We can say further that 
from the record, the prosecuting attorneys at all times 
made available to the defense the results of the medical 
examination which appellant now accuses them of having 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
It can only be concluded that this appeal is without 
merit; that from the testimony of appellant's own witnesses, 
a lack of merit is clearly established. The decision of the 
Court below should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for RespO'ftdent. 
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